However, Thailand later proposed relocating the meeting back to Kuala Lumpur—the same venue as the ceasefire negotiations. Cambodia accepted the change but requested that observers from the United States and China be included once again, as they were during the previous meeting. Thailand has since agreed to this arrangement.
The GBC meeting is being closely watched, with hopes high on both sides that the armed conflict along the border can finally be brought to an end. However, the structure and details of the meeting raise several important points:
1. Extended timeline: Originally planned as a one-day meeting on August 4, both sides have now agreed to extend the talks through August 7.
2. Longest GBC session to date: Preliminary meetings between the secretariats of both countries will run from August 4 to 6, with the full GBC session taking place on August 7.
3. Length of preliminary talks: The three-day duration for the secretariat-level discussions suggests a complex agenda with numerous issues likely requiring prolonged negotiation.
4. Observer involvement limited: Observers from the United States and China will only join on August 7, the final day of talks.
5. Unclear demands: No official or public information has been released detailing the specific demands or negotiating positions of either party.
6. Maximalist stances expected: It is typical in bilateral disputes for both sides to begin with "maximum claims"—the strongest possible assertions of their respective positions.
7. Room for compromise: A key question is how much each side is willing to scale down its demands in pursuit of agreement.
8. Lowest acceptable terms: What are the minimum terms each government can mutually accept to resolve the conflict, not just temporarily through a ceasefire, but in substantive terms?
9. Unknown compromise point: Without a mutually acceptable middle ground, the talks risk stalling, as both sides may cling to their maximalist positions.
10. Further negotiations likely: Even if partial progress is made, it is almost certain that the border dispute cannot be fully resolved in a single round of talks—additional meetings will be necessary.
11. Failure scenario: Should the meeting end in failure, it is unclear what the repercussions will be—both along the border and in broader diplomatic relations between the two countries.
12. Thai government preparations: Is the Thai government adequately prepared for potential fallout from an unsuccessful negotiation?
Looking ahead
These 12 observations offer only a preliminary assessment. The substance of the negotiations will likely include highly sensitive issues, such as the status of Ta Khwai Temple and the disputed Chong Arn Ma area—topics fraught with legal and national security complications.
Ultimately, all eyes will be on the final day of talks, August 7. How the meeting concludes could shape not only the future of the Thai-Cambodian border dispute but also the trajectory of bilateral relations in the months to come.
Professor Emeritus Dr Surachart Bamrungsuk