The clock is ticking in the case of Prime Minister and Culture Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, whose leaked audio conversation with Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen is now under review by the Constitutional Court. On August 4, Paetongtarn submitted her defence to allegations that she was disqualified from office under Sections 160(4) and 160(5) of the Constitution for lacking honesty and integrity, and for committing serious ethical breaches.
Political observers believe her chances of surviving the case are slim. While Hun Sen formally holds the post of Senate president, in practice he is regarded as Cambodia’s spiritual leader and the country’s most powerful figure, a reality underscored by recent images showing him personally directing military operations.
The Pheu Thai Party has moved to quash speculation that Paetongtarn plans to resign before the court delivers its ruling, to avoid the stigma of being branded a prime minister lacking in integrity and guilty of serious ethical misconduct.
Paetongtarn’s Secretary-General, Dr Prommin Lertsuridej, insisted there has been no discussion of such a move.
Party spokesman Danuporn Punnakanta also dismissed the rumour and put forward Chaikasem Nitisiri as another Pheu Thai prime ministerial candidate.
If Paetongtarn fails to survive the “Hun Sen audio clip” case, the coalition government will face a major political test. While the case is nominally about an individual, its implications extend to the Pheu Thai Party and its de facto spiritual leader, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
The question is whether coalition partners will still stand with Pheu Thai to support Chaikasem Nitisiri for the premiership.
This political uncertainty is playing out against a backdrop of public opinion that strongly favours the military over the government in handling Thai-Cambodian tensions.
According to a NIDA poll on the Thai-Cambodian situation, 75.73% of Thais trust the armed forces to safeguard national interests, compared with 54.58% for the government and 41.76% for the Foreign Ministry.
When asked about satisfaction with the way the conflict is being managed, 75.42% expressed approval of the military’s role, while 54.43% were dissatisfied with the government’s performance, and 40.31% were unhappy with the Foreign Ministry.
The survey highlights a decline in the government’s popularity, with many respondents linking the handling of the border dispute to Thaksin’s relationship with Hun Sen, and to the controversy over Paetongtarn’s recorded conversation, eroding public confidence.
Even the government’s announcement that it would pursue civil and criminal action in Thai courts against Hun Sen, in his capacity as military commander directing attacks on Thai civilians, was met with scepticism.
The assaults left several dead and destroyed more than 20 hospitals as well as schools and convenience stores, yet doubts remain about how seriously such legal action will be pursued.
The Thai military continues to shoulder the burden of defending the Thai-Cambodian border, despite the 13-point ceasefire agreement reached at the General Border Committee (GBC) meeting in Malaysia on August 7.
While both sides formally committed to halting hostilities, it is widely acknowledged that the terms have not been fully implemented on the ground.
Field reports indicate that Cambodian forces have been adjusting their tactics and preparing for possible renewed clashes.
Measures include increasing troop numbers, upgrading bases, digging trenches, and relocating heavy weapons along the entire frontier, from Chong Bok, Sam Tae, Phu Makua, and Chong Tha Thao, to Ta Muen Thom Temple, the Preah Vihear area, Wat Kaew Sikha Khiri Sawara, Huai Ta Maria, and Chong An Ma.
Cambodia has also yet to respond to Thailand’s proposals at the GBC for cooperation on landmine clearance and the suppression of call-centre scam syndicates operating from border zones.
As a result, Thai troops continue to face hidden dangers from Cambodian-laid landmines, with ongoing patrol operations resulting in severe injuries, including soldiers losing limbs.
Adding to the tension, swarms of drones have been spotted flying over airfields, ammunition depots, explosives stores, military residences, and hospitals in 14 Thai provinces.
The flights appear intended as intimidation, and are suspected to be the work of foreign nationals and certain Thai individuals who have lost benefits due to the crackdown on call-centre crime networks.
Within military circles, it is understood that regardless of future changes in government, the post of defence minister will not be left unfilled. The name already being positioned for the role is Gen Chalermphon Srisawasdi, former Chief of Defence Forces, who made his first public appearance in some time at the 138th anniversary of the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy on August 5.
Military sources say the new defence minister must command the respect of Cambodia’s leadership. The decision to leave the seat vacant for now is linked to waiting until Gen Chalermphon completes his term as a senator, expected around September.
Chalermphon is known as a “close friend across generations” of former army chief Gen Apirat Kongsompong. A cavalry officer by background, he rose through both combat command and staff positions, having taken part in key political events and contributed to the “Chakrabongse Bhuvanath” operational plan during the Preah Vihear conflict in 2011.
At the same time, with the government’s bargaining power limited, army commander-in-chief Gen Pana Klaewplodthuk has been left to draw up the army’s reshuffle list without political interference, particularly to ensure continuity in the still-unresolved Thai-Cambodian border mission.
A key post to be filled is that of commander of the 2nd Army Area, to replace Lt Gen Boonsin Padklang, who will retire in September. Military insiders insist the choice should be made solely by the army chief, without outside pressure.
Although there has been some public support for the government to extend Lt Gen Boonsin’s term so he can continue leading the 2nd Army Area against Cambodian forces, such a move is seen as virtually impossible. It would breach long-standing military tradition and could breed mistrust among senior officers.
The name now emerging as his successor is Maj Gen Weerayuth Raksilp, the 2nd Army Area’s deputy commander responsible for operations and intelligence, and a Class 26 graduate of the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School, the same class as both the army chief and Lt Gen Boonsin. He is expected to take the reins during what many see as a mid-battle command change.
Weerayuth Raksilp was part of the Thai secretariat team in three days of negotiations with their Cambodian counterparts, which led to the 13-point ceasefire proposal signed by the chairmen of the two countries’ General Border Committees (GBC).
He has also been appointed head of the forward command of the 2nd Army Area, established to address the situation in the Chong Bok area and monitor the movements of opposing forces along the frontier since the early stages of the dispute.
Most recently, Weerayuth accompanied Army Chief of Staff General Thongchai Rodyoei to Phnom Penh for the latest meeting of the Thai-Cambodian Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
These roles underscore the fact that, as Thailand’s political landscape undergoes a realignment of power, the military remains a critical force in managing the Thai-Cambodian border conflict.