Third-party mediation risks leaving Thailand at a disadvantage in talks with Cambodia
The General Border Committee (GBC) meeting between Thailand and Cambodia, held from August 4 to 6, 2025, in Malaysia, aims to seek solutions to escalating border tensions following five days of intense clashes that ended with a ceasefire just after midnight on July 29.
The General Border Committee (GBC) meeting between Thailand and Cambodia, held from August 4 to 6, 2025, in Malaysia, aims to seek solutions to escalating border tensions following five days of intense clashes that ended with a ceasefire just after midnight on July 29.
The GBC is a military-level dialogue mechanism led by high-ranking officials from both defence ministries. Thailand’s delegation includes Deputy Defence Minister and Acting Minister Gen Natthapon Nakpanich, Supreme Commander Gen Songwit Noonpakdee, Army Chief Gen Phana Klaewplodthuk, Air Force Chief ACM Phanphakdee Phattanakul, and Navy Chief Adm Jiraphon Wongwit.
Cambodia is expected to send Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Gen Tea Seiha, Supreme Commander Gen Vong Pisen, Deputy Supreme Commander and Army Chief Gen Meas Sophea, Deputy Supreme Commander and Air Force Chief Gen Cheang Samnang, and Navy Chief Adm Tea Vinh.
However, it remains to be seen whether top military commanders from both Thailand and Cambodia will attend the meeting, as the GBC platform carries no legally binding force. It serves merely as a forum for discussions between defence ministries and military chiefs of the two countries.
A previous GBC session on May 1 failed to prevent the July clashes despite focusing on troop movements and deployment near the border. That round functioned more as a tension-relief valve than a conflict-resolution tool.
This latest round of talks is therefore under intense scrutiny. Although both sides agreed to a ceasefire, Cambodia has continued reinforcing its troops, with no indication of pulling back. Meanwhile, drone incursions into Thai airspace—particularly over bases housing F-16 and Gripen fighter jets—have prompted the Thai military to ban drone flights and deploy anti-drone countermeasures.
One key issue to watch is whether the GBC will address territorial control. During the recent fighting, Thai troops advanced into disputed areas where Cambodian forces had previously violated the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by building structures and establishing a military presence.
For example, in the Chong Arn Ma area of Ubon Ratchathani, Thai forces pushed into zones where Cambodian troops had quietly constructed buildings. For the first time, Thai forces reached the Ta Om monument and destroyed several Cambodian military outposts.
A similar situation unfolded at Phu Makua in Si Sa Ket province, where Cambodia had established a cable car system and base in violation of the MOU. Thai forces responded by dismantling the facilities and expelling Cambodian troops from the area.
As of now, Thai troops have secured several strategic locations under the MOU framework. However, one notable exception is the Ta Khwai Temple in Surin, where Cambodia continues to hold the high ground known as Hill 350. Cambodian troops have also entered the temple compound, using it as a shield in violation of international norms prohibiting military use of heritage sites.
The GBC does not have a mandate to demarcate the border, focusing instead on military cooperation. However, if Cambodia proposes that Thailand withdraw to pre-conflict positions and return all recently secured areas, it will test the stance of the Thai delegation led by Gen Natthapon.
Should Thailand agree to such conditions, the five days of conflict would appear futile—resulting only in casualties and destruction, with no strategic gains.
More critically, Cambodian leaders Hun Sen and Prime Minister Hun Manet have succeeded in internationalising the conflict by involving third parties. The ceasefire negotiations included Malaysia (as ASEAN chair), along with the United States and China as observers. These three countries are also involved in the current GBC talks.
Hun Sen and Hun Manet are well aware that bilateral talks with Thailand have made little progress over decades, with no clear path to border demarcation. By bringing in third parties, they see a greater chance of advancing their claims.
Thus, the involvement of Malaysia, the US and China in the GBC may represent the first step in Cambodia’s broader strategy to shift the issue into a multilateral framework—potentially paving the way for international pressure on Thailand to make concessions.
If third-party participants go beyond observing and begin influencing outcomes, Thailand could find itself at a strategic and diplomatic disadvantage.
The GBC is a military-level dialogue mechanism led by high-ranking officials from both defence ministries. Thailand’s delegation includes Deputy Defence Minister and Acting Minister Gen Natthapon Nakpanich, Supreme Commander Gen Songwit Noonpakdee, Army Chief Gen Phana Klaewplodthuk, Air Force Chief ACM Phanphakdee Phattanakul, and Navy Chief Adm Jiraphon Wongwit.
Cambodia is expected to send Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Gen Tea Seiha, Supreme Commander Gen Vong Pisen, Deputy Supreme Commander and Army Chief Gen Meas Sophea, Deputy Supreme Commander and Air Force Chief Gen Cheang Samnang, and Navy Chief Adm Tea Vinh.
However, it remains to be seen whether top military commanders from both Thailand and Cambodia will attend the meeting, as the GBC platform carries no legally binding force. It serves merely as a forum for discussions between defence ministries and military chiefs of the two countries.
A previous GBC session on May 1 failed to prevent the July clashes despite focusing on troop movements and deployment near the border. That round functioned more as a tension-relief valve than a tool for conflict resolution.
This latest round of talks is therefore under intense scrutiny. Although both sides agreed to a ceasefire, Cambodia has continued reinforcing its troops, with no indication of pulling back. Meanwhile, drone incursions into Thai airspace—particularly over bases housing F-16 and Gripen fighter jets—have prompted the Thai military to ban drone flights and deploy anti-drone countermeasures.
One key issue to watch is whether the GBC will address territorial control. During the recent fighting, Thai troops advanced into disputed areas where Cambodian forces had previously violated the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by building structures and establishing a military presence.
For example, in the Chong Arn Ma area of Ubon Ratchathani, Thai forces pushed into zones where Cambodian troops had quietly constructed buildings. For the first time, Thai forces reached the Ta Om monument and destroyed several Cambodian military outposts.
A similar situation unfolded at Phu Makua in Si Sa Ket province, where Cambodia had established a cable car system and base in violation of the MOU. Thai forces responded by dismantling the facilities and expelling Cambodian troops from the area.
As of now, Thai troops have secured several strategic locations under the MOU framework. However, one notable exception is the Ta Khwai Temple in Surin, where Cambodia continues to hold the high ground known as Hill 350. Cambodian troops have also entered the temple compound, using it as a shield in violation of international norms prohibiting military use of heritage sites.
The GBC does not have a mandate to demarcate the border, focusing instead on military cooperation. However, if Cambodia proposes that Thailand withdraw to pre-conflict positions and return all recently secured areas, it will test the stance of the Thai delegation led by Gen Natthapon.
Should Thailand agree to such conditions, the five days of conflict would appear futile—resulting only in casualties and destruction, with no strategic gains.
More critically, Cambodian leaders Hun Sen and Prime Minister Hun Manet have succeeded in internationalising the conflict by involving third parties. The ceasefire negotiations included Malaysia (as ASEAN chair), along with the United States and China as observers. These three countries are also involved in the current GBC talks.
Hun Sen and Hun Manet are well aware that bilateral talks with Thailand have made little progress over decades, with no clear path to border demarcation. By bringing in third parties, they increase their chances of advancing their claims.
Thus, the involvement of Malaysia, the US and China in the GBC may represent the first step in Cambodia’s broader strategy to shift the issue into a multilateral framework—potentially paving the way for international pressure on Thailand to make concessions.
If third-party participants go beyond observing and begin influencing outcomes, Thailand could find itself at a strategic and diplomatic disadvantage.
